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2 
Introduction 
 
In the 1960s, diagnostic medicine underwent a revolution. Traditional diagnostic methods 
used in clinical practice, like interpreting case histories, were discredited as illegitimate 
science and replaced by methods that looked more like standard scientific models used in 
research (Horwitz, 2007). After this transition, providers’ primary objective became 
cataloguing symptoms and making discrete diagnoses versus collecting extensive patient 
histories and ascribing behaviors and actions to underlying psychological needs  (Horwitz, 
2007). 
 
This change in standards was problematic for dynamic psychiatrists who based their craft 
around the analysis of case histories, yet needed to maintain their relationship with 
medicine in order to retain their credibility as professionals that treat mental illness. 
Without a strong association with medicine, there was nothing that distinguished 
psychiatry from other forms of social work that also performed psychoanalysis as part of 
their job (Horwitz, 2007). This meant that dynamic psychiatrists had to change their 
clinical approach to better fit the new research model spurring the transition from dynamic 
to diagnostic psychiatry (Horwitz, 2007). 
 
The diagnostic psychiatric model emphasized the precise identification and treatment of 
discrete, universal mental illnesses. Consequently, an effort ensued to create a standard 
diagnostic manual of syndromes for a variety of mental disorders, resulting in the birth of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). However, because 
clinicians were going to comprise the bulk of people who used the manual, the DSM needed 
to satisfy both the conditions of a research model and the interests of physicians in 
maintaining their client base​1​ (Horwitz, 2007). This social and financial incentive led to the 
transformation of “problems of the living” treated in dynamic psychiatry’s upper-class 
clientele into discrete mental illnesses along with conditions like schizophrenia in the DSM 
(Horwitz, 2007). Therefore, the list of mental illnesses found in the DSM are not exclusively 
based on science and in fact continue to be molded by changing cultural values and social 
action. For example, homosexuality was removed from the DSM-II in 1973 in the midst of 
changing social opinions and values about the appropriateness of homosexuality (Horwitz, 
2007). 
 
Although the DSM is structured to fit the biomedical model, it is molded by social and 
political interests. This is problematic because western health authorities market the text 
as a guide to mental illness that emerged as a result of scientific discovery. Standardizing 
the use of the DSM is tempting because if it is true that the diagnosis and treatment of 
mental illness is a mathematical algorithm where ‘x’ number of specific symptoms equals 
‘y’ disease, the manual is a great asset to clinical practice.  
 
However, although the theory that there are specific symptoms and behaviors that 
universally correlate with discrete mental illnesses is seductive, it is not reality. Regional 
cultural values shape the opinions, behaviors, and norms for individuals in a society 
meaning that the symptoms and behaviors associated with mental illness are dependent on 
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the social context in which they are being evaluated. Trying to use a strictly objective model 
for mental illness is therefore problematic because social values are an intrinsic part of the 
diagnosis process​2​.  
 
Moreover, there are other reasons why a more scientific model for mental illness is 
insufficient. Western societies “typically contain legislation that implies a special 
relationship between mental illness and responsibility” (Edwards, 2009). The mental 
illness label comes with certain assumptions about a person’s rational and volitional 
capacities and thus their ability to act in a reasonable manner and control certain 
behaviors. When we ask questions about whether a person is mentally ill, we are 
simultaneously asking if we believe that the person should not be responsible for actions 
related to his condition. This decision is intrinsically normative as debates over what we 
ought to do requires ethical analysis (Edwards, 2009).  
 
In this essay, I describe the benefits of using a normative conception of mental illness and 
argue that this model is the best way to achieve appropriate psychiatric diagnoses. First I 
outline several popular scientific frameworks for understanding mental illness and point 
out the problems that arise in these more objective models. Then I discuss the benefits of a 
more normative account and expand on current ethical models by providing an account of 
the capacities and conditions necessary for responsibility. Finally I marry my account of 
responsibility with a normative account of mental illness and illustrate how this framework 
creates space for different degrees of patient responsibility by applying it to specific patient 
case studies. Ultimately, I aim to create a more appropriate and comprehensive model for 
recognising and treating psychiatric dysfunction in clinical practice. Physicians need to 
shift away from using more objective accounts of psychological dysfunction in practice and 
embrace the ethical implications of the mental-illness label. By carefully balancing 
normative and pragmatic considerations, providers can create more effective and just 
therapeutic regimens that are tailored to individual patients’ circumstances and needs.  
 
Chapter 1: Defining psychological dysfunction 
 
There are many different scientific, philosophical, and ethical models used to understand 
what constitutes mental illness. These conceptions of psychiatric disease vary by how 
much importance is placed on physical, mental, and social determinants of health as well as 
their focus on mind-independent symptoms (behavior, neurological changes, physiological 
changes) versus mind-dependent symptoms (dysphoria, delusion, rationality). In all 
accounts for defining psychiatric disorder, there is a common question raised and 
addressed as to whether diagnosing mental illness is possible using objective 
measurements versus normative contextual analysis.  
 
The latest edition of the DSM, the predominant authority for identifying and categorizing 
mental illnesses in clinical practice in the United States, determines what constitutes a 
mental disorder using the parameters below: 
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a mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance 
in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a 
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying 
mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress 
or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or 
culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as death of a loved 
one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g. political, religious, or 
sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not 
mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the 
individual, as described above (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 1)  
 
There are several key issues with the criteria defined by the DSM-5. What constitutes a 
“clinically significant disturbance” is very subjective and dependent on patient and 
provider factors. The source of an individual’s mental dysfunction that causes this 
disturbance is attributable to biological, psychological, and social factors in undefined 
proportions, which leaves the causative agent for a patient's mental illness broad and 
vague (Ghaemi, 2003). Additionally, judging if a specific response is culturally appropriate 
or acceptable to a given stressor is subjective and non-universal. This becomes problematic 
for psychiatry, which must use objective measures and science to form diagnostic criteria 
in order to be considered a branch of medicine (Horwitz, 2007).  Finally, what is meant by 
the term “dysfunction” and how to assess whether an individual has an internal 
dysfunction that causes abnormal behavior (mental illness) or is deviant for alternative 
reasons is not specified (Wakefield, 1992). 
 
Different models for identifying what constitutes a mental disorder deviate or compliment 
the DSM to different degrees. Some of the frameworks are incorporated within the DSM-5 
(i.e. the Biopsychosocial model) while others like the Harmful Dysfunction model are in 
response and to it. Below, I outline some of the predominant accounts used to understand 
and define psychological dysfunction with a consideration of the benefits and potential 
problems associated with each lens. Finally, I end by suggesting that a deeply normative 
model of mental illness (and mental illness ascriptions) best reconciles our descriptive and 
normative practices, including the development of mental illness categories, the removal of 
old ones, and diagnosis/treatment in therapeutic practice . 
  
 
The Biopsychosocial Model 
 
Within the current medical profession, the biopsychosocial (BPS) model of mental disorder 
has taken the position of authority for determining the causes and requirements of mental 
illness and​ ​shapes DSM-5 criteria as well as treatment approaches. Under this framework, 
mental illness is understood to be the product of biological, psychological, and social 
factors that all contribute to the formation of psychiatric disease (Ghaemi, 2003). Nassir 
Ghaemi, an academic psychiatrist, asserts that although this holistic understanding of 
illness is comprehensive and valuable, in practice, such a broad approach has evolved into 
“a confusing set of assumptions about the content of mental disorders… and does little but 
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assert that all illnesses have components that are, unsurprisingly, biological, psychological, 
and social” (Ghaemi, 2003).  
 
One of the major issues with the biopsychosocial model is that it does not identify the 
degree to which each component (biology, psychology, sociology) contributes to the 
underlying cause of disease. The BPS model is like a “list of ingredients, as opposed to a 
recipe. To cook a meal, it is not sufficient to simply know the list of ingredients. One also 
has to know how much of each ingredient to use, and in which order” (Ghaemi, 2003).  
 
The lack of clarity about how much different factors contribute to psychiatric disorder is 
concerning considering how much the BPS model is used in clinical practice and the 
spectrum of treatment options currently offered for mental illness. The BPS model “only 
lists relevant aspects of psychiatry; it is silent on how to understand those aspects under 
different conditions and in different circumstances” (Ghaemi, 2003). Without this kind of 
specificity, both psychopharmaceutical and psychoanalytic methods are theoretically valid 
therapeutic options for any given mental illness. If, as assumed by the BPS model, all 
psychiatric illnesses “are biological, psychological, and social… then it would seem to 
follow that everyone should receive both biological and psychological treatments” (Ghaemi, 
2003). However, this is a “false and faulty belief that stems directly from the 
biopsychosocial model” and in clinical practice is a harmful oversimplification​2​ (Ghaemi, 
2003). 
 
For example, take two patients who are both diagnosed with major depressive disorder 
using the characteristic symptoms of this condition outlined in the DSM-5. The DSM-5 
states that an individual must be experiencing five or more of the eight symptoms below 
during two consecutive weeks and at least one of the symptoms must be depressed mood 
or loss of interest/pleasure. 
 
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day. 
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of 
the day, nearly every day. 
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain, or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day. 
4. A slowing down of thought and a reduction of physical movement (observable by 
others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down). 
5. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
6. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly every day. 
7. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day. 
8. Recurrent thoughts of death, recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or 
a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide (APA, 2013) 
 
To receive a diagnosis of depression, these symptoms must cause the individual clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
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functioning. Additionally, these symptoms cannot be a result of substance abuse or another 
medical condition​. 
Patient one has been experiencing all eight symptoms nearly every day ever since her 
brother and father died in a car accident. Her depression is caused by a traumatic life event 
in which she lost a significant portion of her family, and her condition is sustained because 
of the economically depressed neighborhood she lives in, limiting her job opportunity and 
hope.  
Patient two has not experienced this kind of life event and lives in a stable environment. He 
has felt sad and worthless for as long as he can remember. His family reports that they can’t 
remember a time when he was ever happy, and that his weight, daily behaviors, and overall 
pleasure have remained constant. Patient two is diagnosed as depressed, but unlike patient 
one, his depression is caused by an inherent reduced dopamine receptor function.  
A physician abiding by the BPS model would likely assume that the causes for patient one 
and patient two’s depression were a complex mixture of biological, psychological, and 
social components and prescribe similar treatments to each person though the source of 
the condition is not the same between them. Patient one’s depression is primarily due to 
social and psychological forces that leave her isolated and hopeless while patient two 
suffers from an imbalance of neurotransmitters (i.e. a concentration of neurotransmitters 
that significantly deviates from normal neuroanatomical ranges). Treating both patients 
with antidepressant medications and therapy doesn’t lead to equal or optimum therapeutic 
effect for either patient though the disease label is identical. As noted above, using DSM-5 
criteria, both patients would be diagnosed with the same underlying illness. Given their 
very different etiologies, this assumption may be unwarranted.  
Using the BPS model, current clinical assessment of mental illness is often more focused on 
linking syndromes to discrete disorders versus identifying what is causing the symptoms 
because it is preemptively assumed that multiple and complex factors cause psychiatric 
disorders (Horwitz, 2007). Consequently, the BPS framework leaves clinicians with a 
spectrum of causal factors that are too broad and ill-defined to effectively treat the specific 
source of mental illnesses, and treatment becomes more focused on mitigating symptoms 
than discovering why these symptoms are occurring. The biopsychosocial model does a 
good job acknowledging that there are numerous forces that can lead to mental illness. 
However, without clearly defining to what degree each component influences the causal 
root of disease, and without a clear specification of what mental disorders ​are​, it is an 
incomplete model for assessing and treating psychiatric disorders. 
  
An alternative: Jerome Wakefield’s ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ Analysis 
 
Jerome Wakefield believes that problems with the BPS model and the DSM-5 arise at a 
fundamental level as neither offers a clear reason why specific syndromes are mental 
disorders. He asserts that a correct and clearer understanding of disorder “is essential for 
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constructing ‘conceptually valid’ diagnostic criteria that are good discriminators between 
disorder and nondisorder” (Wakefield, 1992). Without a concrete definition of dysfunction, 
the BPS model and the DSM-5 lack a solid foundation for identifying why and when a set of 
behaviors and cognitions are considered disordered and this creates a problem at the 
earliest point in the diagnostic process. It is illogical to talk about what forces 
contribute/cause mental illness without a specific conception of when a syndrome is a 
psychological dysfunction. 
  
Wakefield aims to expand the scope of his discussion by creating a unifying account of 
disorder that can accommodate physical and mental illnesses. His “harmful dysfunction 
(HD)” model offers clear criteria to identify medical disorders based on the premise that 
illnesses are best recognized as having subjective and objective components. Wakefield 
asserts that neither lens alone sufficiently explains why we call certain conditions 
disorders. Thus, he concludes that “a disorder exists when the failure of a person’s internal 
mechanisms to perform their functions as designed by nature impinges harmfully on the 
person’s well being as defined by social values and meanings” (Wakefield, 1992). In 
Wakefield’s HD model, dysfunction “is a scientific term based in evolutionary biology” and 
describes “the failure of an internal mechanism to perform its natural function for which it 
was designed” while harmful is meant to capture the “consequences that occur to a person 
because of the dysfunction and are deemed negative by sociocultural values” (Wakefield, 
1992). The HD framework contains an objective etiologic criterion as an attempt  to be 
value-neutral and requires that a dysfunction be harmful to social function in order to 
acknowledge the role of culture in shaping conceptions of illness and health. This 
combination of scientific and normative analysis creates a system for identifying disease 
that is biologically valid and can be used in multiple contexts.  
  
Under the HD model, a disorder is more than statistical deviance or the presence of 
“lesions” (abnormalities in structures) (Wakefield, 1992). Wakefield argues that there are 
many instances of statistical deviance that we don’t consider illness, like acute intelligence, 
as well as statistically normal conditions, like obesity, that we do consider illness and 
consequently statistical frequency is a poor criterion for disorder (1992). Similarly, the 
presence of a lesion doesn’t always indicate illness, like having a fully functional heart 
positioned on the right side of the body, and there are plenty of cases where illness exists 
even in the absence of a lesion like senile pruritus (itchy and scaly skin) (Wakefield 1992). 
These examples demonstrate that most strictly objective analyses of disorder are 
incomplete. Etiological conceptions of disorder, like Wakefield’s, have an advantage over 
statistical or lesion-based views; however, Wakefield himself argues that this is not enough 
to ground a theory of mental or physical illness. This is because we must also consider 
cultural and social differences in how dysfunctions are understood and accommodated. 
Because the illness label is not universal, Wakefield concludes that categorizing a condition 
as a disorder is not neutral or independent of social values and perceptions and requires 
some degree of normative evaluation. 
  
However, Wakefield is not satisfied with a purely subjective conception of psychiatric 
disease. He claims that “the fact that all disorders are undesirable and harmful according to 
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social values shows only that values are part of the concept of disorder, not that disorder is 
composed only of values” (Wakefield, 1992). He supports his claim by providing examples 
of many undesirable conditions like pain during teething or externally driven instances of 
misfortune like poverty that are not socially desirable yet not considered disorders 
(Wakefield,1992). Additionally, he argues that a purely subjective approach only identifies 
what symptoms are indicators of illness but not the cause of these symptoms (Wakefield, 
1992). Recognizing these problems, Wakefield concludes that a good theory of disorder 
requires a consideration of designed biological function. He ultimately concludes that 
illness, both physical and mental, is the result of evolved (etiological) mechanisms not 
performing the job they were designed to perform and that therefore harm the person with 
the disorder (Wakefield, 1992).  For example, if a heart could not circulate blood than we 
would say that it is not performing its etiological function in the cardiovascular system. 
Such a disorder would lead to straightforward harms to a person and thus would be an 
illness in Wakefield’s view. 
 
To account for cases of mental disorder that have no clear physical dysfunctional 
mechanism, like delusions, Wakefield asserts that etiological mechanisms exist at both the 
physical and mental levels (Wakefield, 1992). He argues that certain thought processes, 
moods, or other psychologically related behaviors negatively or positively influence an 
individual’s fitness and consequently are subject to the process of evolution (Wakefield, 
1992). In the delusion example above, Wakefield may argue that having intense delusions 
could be the result of a mental mechanism responsible for perception malfunctioning, and 
this lack of access to reality could be a harmful to an organism’s ability to perform essential 
functions like obtaining food. Therefore, delusions could be a harmful dysfunction rooted in 
a malfunctioning mental mechanism. 
  
Using the harmful criterion in conjunction with the etiological requirement, Wakefield is 
able to clarify that a dysfunctional evolved mechanism only results in a disorder when the 
defect causes an undesirable outcome for the individual. For example, if the heart circulates 
blood through an alternative means compared to normal circulation, yet did so in a manner 
that still supported the organism’s physiological needs, then this heart would not be 
considered diseased because the abnormality doesn’t disrupt the organism’s ability to 
maintain homeostasis or participate in social/physical environments (Wakefield, 1992). 
  
Within philosophical literature, Wakefield’s HD model is perhaps the most agreed-upon 
conception of disorder as it balances both objective and normative factors that contribute 
to the dysfunction label. However, this model is better equipped to define physical 
disorders and is incomplete and problematic for mental disorders for several reasons. 
Wakefield’s discussion of mental mechanisms allows for the inclusion of psychological 
disorders like delusions to fit under the HD model, but identifying the evolved function of 
these mental mechanism is difficult and imprecise. Two major opponents of the HD model, 
Dominic Murphy and Robert Woolfolk, describe some of the major obstacles to identifying 
dysfunctional evolved mental mechanisms, including the existence of spandrels and the 
mismatch between etiological design and current environment. Wakefield’s own response 
to these objections illuminates the weaknesses in his model. 
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A spandrel refers “to any undersigned side effect of design” and in the context of biology 
would capture any feature that was not selected for directly but instead is the result of a 
different evolved characteristic (Wakefield, 2000). The human chin is the classic example of 
a biological spandrel as the chin itself serves no adaptive function and is only present as a 
byproduct of other evolved functions and mechanism involved with chewing and 
respiration. Although a chin is useful, even potentially relevant to evolutionary fitness, it 
does not come directly from evolutionary processes and instead is an indirect result. 
 
Woolfolk and Murphy object that “’if mental spandrels exist, then there are mental 
mechanisms that are the byproducts of evolution, but have themselves never possessed 
adaptive functions,’” and therefore under the HD analysis, these mechanisms cannot be 
dysfunctional because they lack etiological functions, yet they still appear capable of 
causing pathology (Wakefield, 2000). Wakefield assumes that useful capacities are likely 
directly evolutionarily developed, but this isn’t necessarily true. For example, the capacity 
to understand math may be an indirect product of pattern recognition. Finding patterns in 
nature could be an etiological capacity as it could allow humans to remember what kinds of 
plants/animals were dangerous or could be used for food. While similar processes may aid 
someone in understanding math, the ability to do math isn’t the direct result of evolution. 
Therefore, someone who is incapable of doing math can never be considered disordered 
because the capacity to do math is not an etiological function. If an evolutionary story can 
be told that is irrelevant to why a trait exists, this begs the question as to how do we know 
what capacities are products of evolution and thus can be dysfunctional? Woolfolk and 
Murphy recognize this problem and argue that distinguishing between evolved mental 
mechanisms and spandrel mental mechanisms is imprecise and cannot be done only with 
biological science. Additionally, if mental spandrels produce disorder, then the HD analysis 
doesn’t account for these diseases and is consequently incomplete.  
 
Wakefield responds to these objections as misunderstandings of the HD analysis but his 
examples seem to demonstrate more problems than offer solutions. For example, 
Wakefield claims that “failure of a spandrel implies a disorder when and only when it 
implies the failure of a naturally selected function” yet offers no clarification or examples of 
how to differentiate between evolved and spandrel mental mechanisms (Wakefield, 2000). 
His counterexamples are mostly limited to physical cases like the inability of the nose to 
hold up a pair of glasses as an instance of a failed spandrel that doesn’t imply disorder 
(Wakefield, 2000).  
 
When trying to apply the same reasoning to dyslexia, Wakefield tacitly appeals to 
normative criteria to determine if an evolved dysfunction is present. Recall that Wakefield’s 
appeal to  etiological function was intended to capture the value-neutral, properly 
scientific, essence of diagnostic criteria. By using normative conceptions of personhood to 
deduce the evolutionary purpose of a mechanism, he undermines his project. He claims 
that when people fail to learn how to read because they “lack educational opportunity, or 
are unmotivated” or are otherwise impacted by other external factors that this inability 
doesn’t indicate disorder (Wakefield, 2000). However, if a person fails to learn how to read 
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“even under optimal learning conditions,” then “we infer that there is something wrong 
with some internal neurological mechanism that when functioning as designed supports 
the capacity to read” (Wakefield, 2000).  
 
A few things must be noted about this response. For one, Wakefield cannot mean that 
humans have evolved the capacity to read as reading is a relatively new ability for the 
species. Thus, Wakefield is assuming that there are etiological mechanisms that when 
normally functioning support the ability to read, and he concludes that the inability to read 
suggests that one of these mechanisms is dysfunctional. This argument is weak and 
problematic for several reasons. Wakefield uses his own definition of etiologic dysfunction 
in his response but never explains how or why we are able “to infer that there is… some 
internal mechanism that when functioning as designed supports the capacity to read” 
(Wakefield, 2000). He assumes that there are evolutionary purposes for mechanisms that 
aid in reading but never proves this point and doesn’t offer clear ways to distinguish 
between evolved versus spandrel mental mechanisms. Wakefield uses a socially desirable 
skill, reading, to determine the presence of dysfunction, but this makes the objective 
etiological requirement contained in the HD framework dependent on social values. He 
depends on normative considerations in order to evaluate both the objective and subjective 
criteria in his HD model and consequently falls short of capturing all instances of 
dysfunction using normative ​and neutral​ requirements. The presence objective and ethical 
components is essential to Wakefield’s argument, but this requirement is clearly violated in 
this example revealing gaps in the HD model.  
  
What is needed is clarification as to why under certain circumstances we would want to 
consider certain behaviors and cognitions the result of a mental disorder. In his argument, 
Wakefield hints at the necessity for contextual evaluation when he classifies dyslexia that 
results from poor edu​catio​n, negative attitude, etc., as normal but dyslexia that isn’t caused 
by other harmful contributing sources, as disordered. ​Wakefield's inability to clearly 
explain why lacking socially useful capacities, like the ability to read, is evidence of an 
evolved function (despite lacking other comorbid psychological problems) is evidence that 
values are playing a neglected or misunderstood role in even his view of illness. Wakefield 
tries to avoid using unscientific values by leaving the scientific concept of dysfunction 
value-neutral. But, given that values are part of both sides of his analysis, this is a problem. 
 
The necessity for normative analysis when classifying dysfunction shouldn’t be framed as 
an opportunity for error and injustice.  There is a “nonarbitrary justification for our 
classification of mental illnesses, but it is based in ethical truths rather than value-free 
features that are unique to mental illness” (Edwards, 2009). A greater appreciation of 
external factors and individual characteristics aids diagnosis and should be evaluated when 
determining the presence of mental illness. With a clear system for specifying when we 
ought to consider an individual disordered and understanding of what this disease label 
means, we increase our ability to capture psychiatric dysfunctions in a way that best 
supports broader social values and individual interest. In my analysis, I will be embracing 
the role of value, especially in the application of illness, and explain the benefits and 
reasons for doing so below. 
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The sick label: an ethical evaluation 
  
The appropriate response to different kinds of dysfunctions invokes values and requires an 
“ethical reflection upon our legal and social rules” (Edwards, 2009). For one, we must 
consider what we are assuming about the individual’s capacities when we diagnose them 
with illness. The “sick label” is a normative label that “​ethically​ ​justifies ​certain 
consequences, such as the ill person adopting the role of patient and social denial of that 
person’s responsibility for some of the person’s actions” (Edwards, 2009).  When we allow 
someone, via diagnosis, to take on the sick role, we are saying that the individual is a 
passive victim in respect to the disease or disorder in question and that he or she cannot 
control certain actions/thoughts that are regulated by the condition. We assume that 
illnesses are external agents that act on patients beyond their control that force them to 
behave in specific ways that may contradict social and legal rules for appropriate action. 
Because the individual is being controlled and coerced by their condition, they they are not 
morally or legally responsible for any actions or cognitions caused by the disorder that 
violate social or legal norms.  
Given the overlap of behaviors and emotions that can be associated with both mental 
illness and deviant behavior, we must recognize why we discourage these behaviors and 
qualities and define under what conditions it’s appropriate to say that these actions and 
characteristics are not within the reach of the individual. There needs to be an account of 
psychiatric disorder that differentiates “mental illnesses from the vast array of irrational 
and pre-rational drives and personality traits for which we usually wish to hold the bearer 
morally responsible” (Edwards, 2009). 
For the kind of value-laden theory I wish to advocate, mental illness is not a consistent set 
of symptoms; “it is a label that stipulates how people should respond to the condition” 
(Edwards, 2009).  When a person has a psychiatric disorder, we reduce the individual’s 
responsibility for actions and cognitions controlled by the illness, but we do so at the cost 
of the individual’s autonomy and ability to take ownership of his or her behavior and 
characteristics. Mental illnesses are “dysfunctions in personhood” and make it so an 
individual is “unable to to fully function as a person owing to impairments of processes and 
capacities that are necessary for being a person” (Edwards, 2009). Consequently, we do not 
grant these individuals the same degree of autonomy or responsibility that we would a 
person with full capacities and abilities. 
 It should be noted that diagnosing physical illnesses is not primarily ethical. Physical 
illnesses often have more concrete and binary associated syndromes making them easier 
recognize and properly diagnose. Physical diseases are almost always cases of “biological 
dysfunctions” while mental illnesses are often identified because they are “social 
dysfunctions” making ethical considerations more integral to the decision of whether 
someone is mentally ill (Edwards, 2009). 
The mere fact “that a biological process is impaired is not sufficient for reduced autonomy 
or responsibility,” instead it is the effect that the malfunctioning mechanism has on “one’s 
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existence not just as a living organism but as a social being with a mental life that is capable 
of being the subject of rights, duties, and responsibilities-- that is relevant to autonomy and 
responsibility” (Edwards, 2009).  When using a normative framework for classifying 
mental illnesses, it is important to specify under what circumstances and for what actions a 
person with the sick label has reduced autonomy and responsibility. For example, someone 
with heart disease is not considered mentally incompetent and unable to make 
autonomous decisions. However, someone who suffers from a discontinuity in character, 
lack of capacity for rational agency, or inability to respond to reason is not able to access, 
interpret, or act on the relevant information necessary to make informed decisions about 
his or her specific condition. Therefore, a person who exhibits any of these characteristics 
can be a proper target for the mental illness label (Edwards, 2009).  
A person who has a mental illness is not morally and/or legally responsible only for actions 
and cognitions ​directly​ impacted by the condition (Nelson and Ramirez, 2017). Imagine 
that an individual tears down and defaces the front of a stop sign. If the individual who tore 
down the sign is anorexic, she would still be held responsible for destroying public 
property because the disease (anorexia) doesn’t directly impair the mental and physical 
processes utilized in deciding and acting to destroy a sign. Society would rightfully hold her 
morally and legally responsible for her actions and blame/punish her for tearing down the 
sign.  
However, what if we discovered that the person who tore down the sign suffered from 
schizophrenia, and that his condition generated delusions that signs were secret agents 
meant to kill him? In this case we may choose to consider him non-autonomous and thus 
not hold him responsible for his actions. This is because his condition makes it so he cannot 
access reality in a way that allows him to obtain rational and reasonable information about 
the purpose and intentions of the signs and respond accordingly; the condition impedes his 
access to reasons directly involved in this decision-making process. A person should have 
reduced responsibility and autonomy for thoughts and actions that are directly impacted 
by a dysfunctional mechanism and can can be granted the sick label in respect to these 
behaviors and conceptions (Nelson and Ramirez, 2017). 
So far in this discussion, we have looked at what the sick label means for the individual in 
question. However, it is important to recognize that these choices are influenced by social 
values and that our final conclusions should reflect broader rules and virtues (Edwards, 
2009). As a person in society, an individual’s actions and thoughts are evaluated in 
relationship to a larger environment with certain rules and virtues. When using a 
normative account of mental illness, the answer as to whether a condition is a mental 
illness changes based on the ethical context in which the decision is made and requires a 
careful consideration of what is just at both micro and macro scales.  
Rules and values that we hold in society are a balance of individual right versus social 
duty/safety. Actions like stealing, violence, and lying are not tolerated in a civil society 
because they endanger the ability of the group to work cohesively under formal and 
cultural standards of compassion and nonviolence. We enforce these principles by teaching 
children their responsibility as citizens to obey social laws and morals under the 
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assumption that people are capable of controlling actions and conceptions involved in 
these rules and values (Edwards, 2009). For example, when we punish a child for acting 
violently and impulsively, “we teach them that they must not only avoid commiting 
rationally calculated evils, but also must actively avoid adopting character traits that lead 
to evil acts” (Edwards, 2009).  
When we deem that a certain mental condition or action is caused by psychiatric 
dysfunction, “we clarify that it is not a legitimate choice for personal development” or 
behavior (Edwards, 2009). Persons are morally responsible for developing and 
maintaining positive personality characteristics “​to the extent that such development can in 
fact be taught​” to the individual (Edwards, 2009).  It is logical to create and enforce formal 
and informal rules for behaviors within the control of the individual because control goes 
hand in hand with autonomy and responsibility.  
Given the intimate link between autonomy/responsibility and mental illness, a clear 
framework and process of determining autonomy and responsibility would be beneficial to 
normative conceptions of psychiatric disorder. However, creating a straightforward or 
well-defined system for determining the degree of agency or control that an individual has 
is challenging. Indeed “rationality is the subject of such an enormous quantity of 
philosophical debate that it is likely impossible to describe without begging some 
questions” (Edwards, 2009).  
Though difficult to craft, an account of agency and responsibility that allows a clinician to 
define these properties on a case-by-case basis is needed when using a normative 
framework of mental illness. With an enhanced understanding of what capacities are 
necessary for responsibility and agency, we could better identify when and what mental 
conditions influenced these capacities, and consequently assign reduced responsibility and 
autonomy (i.e. the sick role) more appropriately. In the following chapter, I aim to create 
this framework and marry it to a normative model of mental illness. By joining these two 
accounts, I ultimately craft a stronger and more comprehensive ethical framework for 
recognizing mental illness and assigning the sick role. 
Chapter 1 Endnotes 
1) Although I focus on the DSM throughout this document, it should be noted that the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) manual has undergone similar, and in some 
cases even more problematic, changes  
2) In the United States, there has been a growing movement in clinical research of mental 
illnesses to abandon the criteria used within the DSM for different mental illness categories. 
In this process, the emergence of new research domain criteria (RDoC) for mental illnesses 
has started to take shape. Researchers investigating and crafting these new criteria aim to 
define more precise, reliable, and objective guidelines for diagnosing psychiatric diseases. 
With a better understanding of the roots and etiology of mental illnesses, clinicians can 
prescribe more appropriate treatment.  
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  Chapter 2: Responsibility, rules, and blame 
 
Questions about responsibility, rationality, and agency are at the center of countless 
philosophical debates. These are difficult topics because they run parallel to ideas about 
personhood and require extensive normative analysis (Edwards, 2009). In this chapter,I 
focus on models of responsibility based on features like rationality, receptivity to reason, 
and reactivity. After articulating the distinctions between these capacities, I offer an 
account of responsibility that is a combination of normative competence and fair 
opportunity.  
 
My criteria create a model of responsibility that, when married to the normative 
conception of mental illness, provides a comprehensive and more ethical approach to 
diagnosing and treating mental illness. This framework challenges current clinical methods 
by suggesting that patients diagnosed with the same condition using DSM-5 criteria can 
have different degrees of responsibility for their condition, thus not equally entitling them 
to the sick role. What constitutes proper therapeutic response should thus be based on a 
case-by-case analysis of different individual and societal ethical considerations. The 
ultimate goal is to demonstrate that there is room for improvement and growth in current 
psychiatric practice that can be partially achieved by incorporating a more moral 
perspective in clinical contexts.  
 
Legal versus Moral Responsibility 
 
Societies create formal rules and laws in order to enforce behaviors and standards that 
embody their core values and morals. In the justice system, “criminal punishment is the 
authorized deprivation of an agent’s normal rights and privileges, because he or she has 
been found guilty of a criminal act,” and punishment as a form of blame requires that the 
agent has commited “culpable wrongdoing” or is responsible for the action being punished 
(Brink and Nelkin, 2011).  
 
Although “criminal law reflects central assumptions about moral responsibility,” legal and 
moral responsibility are not the same thing (Brink and Nelkin, 2011).  This distinction is 
important but beyond the scope of this discussion. In the sections below, I focus on moral 
culpability and create a framework of capacities and situational conditions necessary for 
responsibility.  
 
Responsibility and mental illness  
 
The sick role has direct impact on the degree of responsibility an agent carries for specific 
actions, under the assumption that individuals are passive victims to their condition 
(Edwards, 2009). When we clarify what capacities are required for responsibility, it helps 
reveal what conditions are mental illnesses (i.e. the conditions that impact these abilities). 
Insights into concepts described below like normative competence and fair opportunity 
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will give us better tools for making appropriate decisions as to when a condition ought to 
be labeled a mental illness and a person be allowed to adopt the sick role. Therefore, 
attaching a framework of responsibility to a normative account of mental illness creates a 
stronger and more comprehensive framework. 
 
When trying to decide if an agent should be held responsible for deviant behavior, we are 
not asking whether the agent did or didn’t act in alignment with moral norms or even if the 
agent had first order knowledge (semantic understanding) that his actions violated these 
norms. What needs to be determined is if the agent had the capacities necessary to 
recognize, understand, and react to the ethical consequences of his actions as well as a fair 
opportunity to exercise these capacities in a manner that matched his will. Responsibility 
must be predicated on “the possession, rather than the use,” of volitional and cognitive 
capacities and a fair opportunity to act on these abilities (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). My 
proposed model of responsibility as a combination of normative competence and fair 
opportunity is in service of the larger goal of this paper to craft guidelines for determining 
when and why a condition should be considered a mental illness and a person be allowed 
to adopt the sick role.  
 
Attributable versus moral responsibility 
 
In discussing ​moral​ responsibility, it’s important to distinguish this type of responsibility 
from attributable responsibility. More responsibility is a subtype of attributable 
responsibility. This two can be teased apart by looking at emotional responses to certain 
actions. 
 
Reactive attitudes are “emotional responses directed at oneself or another in response to 
that person’s conduct” and include love, hate, pride, etc. (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Within 
this broad class of emotions is a subgroup of moralized reactive attitudes that “reflect 
assumptions about responsibility” (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Take for example happiness 
and gratitude. If one day you showed up to work and there were cookies at the office you 
would likely feel happy that this treat had magically appeared. However, without a clear 
source of where these cookies came from, it would be odd to feel gratitude as this emotion 
is best directed towards a specific agent who acted in way that benefited you. If Sally from 
the office made you cookies, you would likely be grateful to Sally as Sally made them 
specifically for your enjoyment and behaved in a way that impacted you positively. In this 
scenario Sally’s actions (giving you the cookies) matched her “quality of will in the right 
way” as she intended to give you the cookies and thus she is responsible for the action and 
a proper target for gratitude as a moral reactive attitude (Brink and Nelkin, 2011).  
 
However, if you later found out that Sally wanted to give those cookies to Steve, but 
accidentally put them on your desk instead of his, you may be happy that you have cookies 
but you likely wouldn’t feel gratitude towards Sally because Sally didn’t intend to give you 
the cookies. This example shows how responsibility requires both attributability (the agent 
identified is the agent that did the action) and accountability (the action performed was the 
action the agent meant to perform). Reactive attitudes are appropriate “just in the case the 
16 
targets of these attitudes are responsible” and importantly it is the “responsibility of the 
targets that makes the reactive attitudes toward them fitting” (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). An 
agent must be the actor for a given behavior and the action must reflect the agent’s 
intentions in order to be a proper target for moralized reactive attitudes like blame and 
praise. When we understand that the behavior of an individual is regulated by certain 
cognitive capacities and situational factors, we create room for different degrees of 
responsibility and thus different degrees of ‘blameworthy-ness’ and ‘praiseworthy-ness’ 
that an agent is appropriately able to possess. 
 
When ascribing moral responsibility, intuition can provide us with some seemingly obvious 
answers. We do not blame leaves for falling or lions for hunting gazelles, yet we do hold 
most adults responsible for their actions and have varying degrees of responsibility we 
assign to adolescents. How can we begin to tease apart the different degrees of 
responsibility that are appropriate in each of these cases? Below, I address this question by 
describing the two necessary components of responsibility, normative competence and fair 
opportunity, and the subcomponents and capacities included in these two factors that 
comprise responsibility. 
 
Factor 1: Normative Competence  
 
In a nutshell, normative competence is a combination of cognitive and volitional capacities 
that reflect the ability to tell right from wrong and behave in a manner that fits this moral 
understanding (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Both the cognitive and volitional units of 
normative competence require semantic and affective capacities making them nuanced and 
multidimensional. Below, I expand on the capacities captured within these two 
components of normative competence.  
 
Cognitive component 
 
Responsibility is partially predicated on normative competence which “requires the 
cognitive capacity to make suitable normative discriminations, in particular, recognize 
wrong doing” (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Typically, cognitive capacities are assumed to be 
completely semantic in nature, requiring only formal knowledge to be well developed. 
However, this conclusion is misguided. Emotional shortcomings or the inability to step 
away from certain emotions when they arise may compromise cognitive capacity which in 
turn can impact responsibility (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Understanding how cognitive 
capacity is comprised of both semantic and affective components is best achieved when 
each dimension is analyzed separately.  
 
Semantic capacity 
 
The semantic component of cognitive capacity is usually easier to recognize than the 
affective component. We would not hold a dog and an adult equally responsible for 
intentionally killing a cat because the dog is not sentient or self-aware, thus doesn’t 
possess the intellectual capacities to understand moral reasons. The ability to 
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acquire and have this kind of first order knowledge is assumed to be restricted to 
mankind. 
 
However, the importance of semantic capacities can also be demonstrated by 
comparing two adults. If two individuals, one a man and one a woman, both hit 
other people intentionally though they had the affective and intellectual capacities 
to understand this was wrong, then they would be equally responsible for hitting 
other people. However, if we later learned that the man was drunk when he hit the 
other person, though we may blame him for getting drunk, we do not assume he is 
as blameworthy as the sober female for hitting someone because we know that 
consuming alcohol reduces an individual's semantic capacities. How responsible 
and therefore  blameworthy the man and the woman are ​in regards to hitting other 
people ​is different because of differences in their intellectual capacities at the time 
the action was committed. 
 
Affective capacity 
 
Emotions are critical components of attitudes that are essential in motivating or 
guiding the action of agents. Moral value “is not identified with a natural quality 
objectively present in morally considerable beings” instead it is “projected by 
valuing subjects” with requires some degree of empathetic or affective capacity 
(Callicott, 2010). Understanding moral reasons requires “the capacity to appreciate 
their force as moral reasons, which involves the capacity for a certain kind of 
immediate emotional response” (Greenspan, 2003).  If an agent lacks certain 
affective capacities, he or she may lack the ability to recognize/experience the 
“motivational effect” embedded in moral rules and consequently lack “a full 
appreciation of moral reasons” (Greenspan, 2003).  
 
For example, psychopaths are “not personally affected or inhibited by others’ 
emotional responses in the normal fashion” and consequently fail to properly learn 
socially accepted moral rules because they never associate past wrongdoings with 
“emotional anxiety, as needed to bring their past failures to bear on practical 
reasoning”  (Greenspan, 2003). These agents “understand reasons generally but are 
just insensitive to a certain class of reasons,” moral reasons, which involve 
“something like the appropriate assignment of value” to objects (Greenspan, 2003). 
Normal self-control involves “the ability to inhibit action more or less automatically, 
on the basis of emotional responses that reveal moral significance”;  thus agents 
who lack experience in emotional empathy “have a kind of ‘moral learning disability’ 
limiting them to more roundabout means of self-control such as reflection on the 
likely consequences of lawbreaking” (Greenspan, 2003).  
 
However, agents that do have complete affective capacities still may be candidates 
for reduced responsibility. In order to be normatively competent, a person must not 
“simply act on their strongest desires, but be capable of stepping back from their 
desires, evaluating them, and acting for good reasons” (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). For 
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example, the degree of blame we assign to an adult for hitting another person is 
different from the degree of blame we place on an eight year old for hitting another 
person. Why? Both of them are the agents that did the hitting, and they have both 
been formally taught that hitting another person is wrong, thus knowing at a 
semantic level that hitting another person is considered deviant behavior.  
 
In this case, the different amounts of culpability we assign to the adult and the child 
reflects our assumptions about the capabilities of each person to control his 
emotions. We do not believe that the cognitive mechanisms in place that allow for 
an individual to control and act above their desires are as mature in an eight year 
old as they are in an adult. Consequently, the eight year old doesn’t have a fully 
developed normative competence and is not blameworthy or responsible to the 
same degree as the adult is. Normative competence requires both cognitive 
capacities “to distinguish right from wrong and volitional capacities [discussed in 
greater detail below] to conform one’s conduct to that normative knowledge” (Brink 
and Neilkin, 2011). 
 
Full cognitive capacity is a combination of affective and semantic components. Deficits in 
either dimension of cognitive capacity can lead to a compromised normative competence 
which in some situations results in an agent having at least reduced responsibility for the 
action. An agent “can be held responsible for failing to react to reasons he does recognize, 
making him at least partially responsible for his actions” (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998). 
Because a failure to recognize such reasons varies with each situation, case-by-case 
analysis is critical when we understand complete cognitive capacity as a mixture of 
affective and semantic components. Because cognitive capacity is essential to normative 
competence, a required component for responsibility, proper conclusions about the 
appropriate degree of responsibility to assign to an agent are best achieved when each 
aspect of cognitive capacity is individually and comprehensively assessed. The space for 
different degrees of responsibility only grows as we begin to untangle the volitional 
component of normative competence as discussed below. Zooming back out to the overall 
goal of this chapter to better understand responsibility in order to make better conclusions 
about the appropriateness of the mental illness label, we see that differential responsibility 
suggests that the sick role may also come in degrees. 
 
Volitional component 
 
Though cognitive and volitional capacities are integrated and often co-dependent, they are 
nonetheless distinct and neither is individually sufficient for complete normative 
competence. Like cognitive capacity, volitional capacity requires semantic and affective 
appreciation in order to be fully functional. 
 
The most common framework used to distinguish the two dimensions of normative 
competence (cognition and volition) is the “reasons-responsiveness” model (Brink and 
Nelkin, 2011). In this model, proposed by Fischer and Ravizza, the cognitive and volitional 
aspects of reasons-responsiveness are separated from one another in terms of 
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“reasons-receptivity” and “reasons-reactivity” respectively (1998). A good way to 
understand these two qualities is to apply them to a machine. 
 
There are three critical processes that must occur for a machine to do its job. A device must 
be able to 1) properly receive input from the outside world relative to the task at hand 2) 
process this information in a logical fashion that properly reflects the information 
contained in the input and 3) be able to translate its correct interpretation of the input into 
action that is in accordance with the information gathered (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). For 
example, let’s use a phone as our prototype machine. In order to send a text, phone must 
have a functioning keyboard (receive relevant input), software that maintains the proper 
order of the message and packages it properly (process the input properly), and the ability 
to send this message to the correct address in the desired format (act in accordance with 
proper interpretation of information).  A break or malfunction in any one of these steps 
would inhibit the phone from accomplishing the task of sending a text properly. 
 
The reasons-receptivity component is a mixture of components one and two in the example 
above. Both the receiving and processing capacities of a mechanism are critical to its 
overall receptivity (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Reasons-reactivity is analogous to the ability 
of a mechanism to act in accordance with its understanding of the information gathered 
and interpreted. If we recognize that normative competence is a key component of 
responsibility and understand the brain as a system that requires specific capacities to 
accomplish normative competence, then we can see how all three abilities (receiving input, 
processing input, acting on input) are integrated and important when assessing 
responsibility (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Since an error in any dimension of 
reasons-responsiveness can individually compromise normative competence, it can 
consequently impact an agent’s responsibility and thus their right to the sick role.  
 
What is important to note in this model of normative competence is that it allows for a 
spectrum of competency. When assessing the functionality of a person’s cognitive and 
volitional capacities, we are essentially checking how well the individual components that 
contribute to competency are working in order to make judgments about a person’s 
normative competence. This then raises important questions as to how functional each of 
the mechanisms involved in cognitive and volitional capacities need to be in order for a 
person to be considered normatively competent.  
 
When determining if/how much damage to the mental and/or physical mechanisms 
involved in cognitive and volitional capacities impact normative competence and thus 
responsibility, three different dimensions of the broken mechanism need to be assessed. 
These components are 1) the location of the mechanism (in relationship to the action), 2) 
the scope of the problem (what mechanisms are impacted and to what extent), and 3) the 
duration of time that the problem did or has existed (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). All of these 
aspects provide us with unique facets of information that can impact the ultimate 
conclusion about an individual's level of responsibility and thus how appropriate it would 
be for him to adopt the sick role. 
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For example, say that you are walking your dog and a man walking past you kicks your dog 
in the side. If this man was normatively competent, then you would rightfully hold him 
completely responsible for his action. However, suppose that this man suffers from a 
condition that weakens mechanisms involved in specific scenarios that require normative 
competence. Is he still responsible for kicking your dog or should he be allowed to adopt 
the sick role? It depends. If the mental mechanism that was causally responsible for the 
decision to kick your dog is broken at the time of the action in such a way that makes it 
completely dysfunctional (i.e., it is not reasons-responsive), it seems clear that he is 
certainly not entirely responsible for kicking your dog or even partially responsible. The 
malfunctioning mechanism is directly related to the action, the scope of the problem is 
severe, and the damage was present at the time the man kicked your dog, drastically 
compromising the man’s normative competence and thus eliminating his responsibility for 
the act.​3 
 
 Similarly, the presence of any malfunctioning mechanism doesn’t reduce responsibility for 
all actions. If the mechanism is not involved in the decision or action pathway to kick the 
dog, then the man should be responsible for kicking your dog. Because the malfunction 
does not impact his normative capacity in respect to kicking your dog, he is responsible for 
the action of kicking the dog even though he has a malfunction that may implicate his 
normative capacity in respect to other actions. If a student’s foot is broken, he can still 
write and should be expected to write because the site of the damage (the foot) doesn’t 
affect the ability of the student to use his hand to write.  
 
When applied to mental illness and the use of the sick role, two important facts become 
clear. One, patients can be held responsible for prior actions even if the mechanisms 
involved in those actions are now damaged by their condition. Additionally, a patient is still 
responsible for actions that are not impacted by their condition. 
 
What if the broken mechanism is a part of the decision or action pathway to kick your dog, 
but the mechanism is only partially broken or altered? In this scenario it is harder to assign 
absolute responsibility or lack of responsibility since the mechanism is not completely 
implicated in the damage. Here it seems best to say that the man who kicked your dog is 
partially responsible to the degree of  functionality the mechanism still possesses (Brink 
and Nelkin, 2011). If a student broke his pinky on his dominant hand, we may still expect 
him to be able to write but we would likely have different standards and expectations 
about the volume and penmanship the student can achieve. But, if his thumb was broken 
versus his pinky, we may further decrease our expectations of what the student is capable 
of writing as the thumb is a more crucial piece of the hand involved in the ability to 
write--that is, analogically, a more integral part of the mechanism involved in the 
decision/action pathway. 
 
Overall, the cases above demonstrate how each dimension of a mechanism (duration, 
location, and scope) impacts the overall mechanistic function in relationship to the action 
in different ways(Brink and Nelkin, 2011).  Thus when trying to determine responsibility, it 
is important to measure all three aspects of the malfunctioning mechanism in question. 
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Questions about mechanisms in relationship to responsibility are important because they 
provide important considerations in the ethical decision-making process of whether or not 
a person ought to be able to adopt the sick role. Because mental illness labels prejudice our 
assumptions about a person’s autonomy and responsibility in regards to certain actions, 
having a better conception of the degree of responsibility an individual ought to have gives 
us better insight into how appropriate the sick role is and to what extent an individual 
should be able to adopt this role (Edwards, 2009). 
 
Factor 2: Fair opportunity 
 
So far I’ve described the internal cognitive and volitional capacities required for an actor to 
have normative competence and consequently responsibility. However, the social context 
within which a person acts must also be evaluated as external conditions can influence the 
capacities necessary for responsibility. This consideration is the second component of 
responsibility; fair opportunity. Fair opportunity embodies many of the social factors and 
circumstances captured in the biopsychosocial model, and it tells us important information 
about to what degree an individual had the ability avoid and develop certain undesirable 
conditions like addiction. 
 
 A guiding principle underlying responsibility is “the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing” 
or an individual's ability to act in accordance with their intentions given the 
external/internal circumstances under which they acted (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). In order 
to have  a fair opportunity to “avoid wrongdoing, it must be true that when one commits 
wrong, one could have done otherwise” (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). The “ability to do 
otherwise” is made up of various cognitive and volitional capacities that are not impaired 
in any significant relevant way at the time of action (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Thus specific 
“impairments of cognitive and volitional capacities and specific kinds of external” threats to 
our ability to conform to relevant norms undermine the fair opportunity to avoid 
wrongdoing (Brink and Nelkin, 2011).  
 
Because a person's actions and decisions are influenced by internal and external capacities 
and conditions, responsibility therefore is most appropriately thought of as a combination 
of normative competence and fair opportunity. For example, if a woman with full 
normative competence hit her child while in the park, we would hold her responsible for 
this immoral action. However, if we later discovered that the woman was held at gunpoint 
by a man who told her that if she didn’t hit her child, he would shoot the child, we likely 
wouldn’t hold her responsible for hitting her child though she was the actor who did the 
hitting. Under this extreme environmental pressure and threat, the woman was not in a 
position to properly respond in a manner that matched her normative competencies, and 
thus she was not given a fair opportunity to avoid the immoral action.  
 
It can be unreasonable to hold a person accountable for actions beyond their control and 
for external conditions that mitigate cognitive or volitional capacities required for 
normative competence. Situational control and normative competence are therefore 
independent and “individually necessary and jointly sufficient” factors in responsibility 
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(Brink and Nelkin, 2011). There are degrees of each that are required in responsibility and 
“falling short in either dimension is excusing” (Brink and Nelkin, 2011). Using this 
framework of responsibility, each component is a scalar quantity that is context dependent 
and assessed separately for individual cases. 
 
Translating responsibility and normative analysis into clinical actions 
 
Thus far I have argued that a normative framework for recognizing psychological 
dysfunction is more appropriate than other popular accounts used in clinical practice like 
the BPS model. When we determine that a person is mentally ill, we recognize their right to 
adopt the sick role that affects their responsibility and autonomy (Edwards, 2009). These 
features are “qualities of personhood” that dictate our assumptions about a person’s rights, 
duties, and ability to interact with society. Thus our decisions about when a person ought 
to be able to adopt the sick role inform societal assumptions about that individual's agency 
as well as broader social rules and standards about what we believe individuals can and 
should be accountable for (Edwards, 2009).  
 
In the second chapter, I​ ​expanded on existing ethical accounts by fleshing out and outlining 
the capacities necessary for responsibility as this information allows us to make more 
informed conclusions about when a condition ought to warrant an agent less responsible 
for their actions (i.e., when a person ought to be able to adopt the sick role). My framework 
combines normative competence and fair opportunity as necessary and jointly sufficient 
criteria for responsibility and creates space for different degrees of accountability based on 
the functionality of different mechanisms involved in these capacities.  
 
By incorporating and creating a spectrum of responsibility into an ethical account of mental 
illness, I created space for the possibility of varying degrees of the mental illness label. This 
conception of the sick role as a normative label that lies on a gradient is distinct from 
current ethical frameworks that contain a more binary account of the sick role as a label 
that either is or is not appropriate (Edwards, 2009).  
 
It should be noted that this spectrum model of psychiatric disorders may not be a good fit 
for some conditions. Some illness continuums may still be best represented as binary or 
categorical. For example, schizophrenia is a well-defined condition with distinct, 
universally observed symptoms. For this condition, it makes sense to diagnose a person as 
either schizophrenic or not schizophrenic versus partially schizophrenic because the 
disease has clear, severe symptoms and impacts a broad scope of capacities and abilities. 
Contrarily, for a condition like anxiety, it may be more important to determine to what 
degree an individual suffers from the condition as the sick label has dramatic impacts on 
the individual's assumed autonomy as well as the treatment options given to the individual. 
Importantly, this label also influences how the individuals see themselves in relationship to 
the disease and their identity (Charland, 2004). Specifying the degree of anxiety leads to 
better conclusions about the person’s capacities and accountability, leading to better 
treatment as well as nurturing a more appropriate self-concept. 
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In this final section, I apply my crafted requirements for responsibility along with a 
normative conception of mental illness to case studies of psychiatric dysfunction contained 
within the DSM-5. I highlight how differential conclusions about responsibility and the 
appropriateness of the sick label can occur even when the conditions are considered equal 
under current DSM-5 criteria. From this marriage between the normative sick label and a 
fleshed-out conception of responsibility arises a new and potentially more effective 
approach for diagnosing and treating mental illness in clinical practice that requires a 
deeper assessment of individual history and context. 
 
Chapter 2 Endnotes 
 
3) The presence of a malfunctioning mechanism in the present does not mitigate 
responsibility for prior actions. If you learn that the man’s action/decision pathway broke a 
week after he kicked your dog, we would hold still hold him accountable for this action as 
the current state of the mechanism does not implicate his responsibility for prior actions 
that occurred when the mechanism wasn’t damaged. 
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Chapter 3: Clinical Application 
 
Case Study: Alcohol use disorder 
 
The DSM-5 states that alcohol use disorder is a detrimental pattern of alcohol use occurring 
over a year that causes “clinically significant impairment or distress as manifested” when 
two or more of the following symptoms are present (APA, 2013).  
 
● Alcohol used in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than intended 
● Persistent desire or unsuccessful attempts to cut down or control alcohol use 
● Significant time spent obtaining, using, and recovering from the effects of alcohol 
● Craving to use alcohol 
● Recurrent alcohol use leading to failure to fulfil major role obligations at work, 
school, or home 
● Recurrent use of alcohol, despite having persistent or recurring social or 
interpersonal problems caused or worsened by alcohol 
● Recurrent alcohol use despite having persistent or recurring physical or 
psychological problems caused or worsened by alcohol 
● Giving up or missing important social, occupational, or recreational activities due to 
alcohol use 
● Recurrent alcohol use in hazardous situations 
● Tolerance: markedly increased amounts of alcohol are needed to achieve 
intoxication or the desired effect, or continued use of the same amount of alcohol 
achieves a markedly diminished effect 
● Withdrawal: there is the characteristic alcohol withdrawal syndrome, or alcohol is 
taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms (APA, 2013) 
The severity of the condition as mild, moderate, or severe is dictated by the number of 
symptoms observed and early remission is achieved when none of the criteria are 
experienced (except craving) for at least three months (APA, 2013).  
Alcohol use disorder is one of the more controversial diagnoses within the DSM-5 as 
different theories about what contributes to the condition have differential consequences 
on how much accountability the individual is assumed to have for their actions. On one end 
of the spectrum lies the moral model of addiction which views “drug use as a choice” and 
addicts as people with “bad character” (Pickard, 2017). Under this model, addicts are seen 
as fully responsible for their dependence because they are assumed to have a fair 
opportunity to not use drugs, but ​choose​ to continually use them in pursuit of pleasure no 
matter the consequences to themselves or others. Their choice to start using and to 
continue using reflects deficiencies in their personality that are socially condemned, and 
addicts stigmatised as “bad” (Pickard, 2017). The moral model of addiction is the 
predominant framework present in most societies: Alcohol dependence and other forms of 
drug use are cross-culturally severely stigmatised with studies showing that social 
disapproval of addiction is higher than social disapproval of “leprosy, HIV positive status, 
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homelessness, dirtiness, neglect of children, and a criminal record for burglary” (Pickard, 
2017). Individuals who believe in the moral model of addiction think that it is right to 
blame addicts for their behavior because their deviant actions are voluntary and substance 
abuse is best prevented and discouraged in society when viewed as a choice.  
Critics of this framework assert that blaming addicts for their addiction is not the best way 
to motivate them to stop using and worry that cultural stigma associated with addiction 
creates detriments to self-identity that prevent addicts from seeking out the resources they 
need to curb their addiction (Pickard, 2017). Thus, shaming addicts for their behavior or 
holding them responsible for their addiction is not the proper pragmatic response. Instead, 
they define addiction as a disease and drug use as involuntary. Addiction is “a chronic, 
relapsing neurobiological disease” and addicts “literally cannot help using drugs and have 
no choice over consumption” despite personal and social consequences (Pickard, 2017). 
Under this framework, addicts are justified in adopting the sick role as “helpless victims” to 
their addiction (Edwards, 2009). 
Somewhere in between the moral and disease model lies the learning model of addiction. 
The creator of this framework, Marc Lewis, sees both the moral and disease model of 
addiction as problematic (Pickard, 2017). The moral model allows society to shame addicts 
as lazy, self-indulgent, and irresponsible, but the disease model is not better as it “wrongly 
pathologized both the brain and the person” (Pickard, 2017). Lewis asserts that changes in 
the brain that result from addiction are a sign of “neuroplasticity” rather than pathology 
and are completely normal responses to continued drug use that are akin to other kinds of 
learning and habit formation (Pickard, 2017). He also does not believe that the disease 
model is the more pragmatic approach because overcoming addiction requires “a sense of 
agency and empowerment” that is not possible if addicts are viewed as incapable of 
controlling their behaviors without some kind of “cure” (Pickard, 2017). Research supports 
this view as addicts who believe that they are dependent on professional help or other 
medical remedies to curb their behavior (i.e. subscribe to the disease model of addiction) 
are more likely to relapse 6 months post-treatment (Pickard, 2017). 
However, demographic patterns of addicts suggest that addiction is not entirely random 
and that certain social factors and environmental exposures increase the risk of developing 
addictive behaviors because they impact what choices are available (Pickard, 2017). People 
can have more or less options “genuinely available to them, and more or less capacity for 
control” (Pickard, 2017). This fits nicely with the concepts of volitional capacity and fair 
opportunity described in my previous chapter about responsibility. Ultimately, differences 
in addicts’ abilities to control their behavior (differences in volitional capacity/fair 
opportunity)  lead to different degrees of responsibility assigned to them for developing 
and maintaining their addiction. 
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Edwards in his normative analysis of mental illness touches on alcohol addiction and offers 
the following thoughts: 
if the sufferer is completely unable to seek treatment without outside assistance, it 
may be too unfair to apply moral blame for a situation that the sufferer cannot 
change, and that would give good reason to classify alcoholism as a mental illness. 
However, if the barrier to seeking treatment is less than a total barrier, then there 
are strong considerations both in favor of applying the label and in favor of 
withholding it. One would need to determine which of the interests represented by 
the criteria were more important—for example, inculcating values through the 
expression of moral blame, or protecting sufferers from harm by declaring the 
condition an illness rather than a legitimate part of their persona. [Edwards, 2009] 
 
In this excerpt, we see how the ethical decision to legitimize the sick role is largely 
dependent on the context and the specifics of individual cases. In his work, Edwards lays 
out a series of ethical considerations to help clinicians assess when, and why, to diagnose a 
patient as having one or more mental illnesses. 
 
a. Is the condition harmful to the person who has it? 
b. Is there any reason for legitimizing the condition as a character trait that one 
can choose to develop or maintain? 
c. Is the condition one that can be discouraged through the inoculation of 
appropriate moral values during childhood? 
d.  Will applying moral responsibility to the condition uphold broader moral 
values in one’s ethical system 
e. can one have insight into the condition’s effect upon oneself and if so, how 
difficult is it to take an active role in seeking treatment for oneself? [Edwards, 
2009, 83-84]. 
 
In this list, we see that appropriateness of the mental illness label is a balance between 
individual and broader societal considerations. It’s important to emphasize the need for 
case-by-case analysis when assigning responsibility since responsibility lies on a spectrum 
and is dependent on internal capacities in conjunction with external factors that may 
impact an individual’s fair opportunity.  Since the particulars of a patient’s history are 
critical to how we assign the sick label and responsibility, let’s spell out a specific case. 
 
Mr. J is a 42 year old man who has been drinking at least six drinks per day for the last four 
years though he continually tries to stop his compulsive behavior. He started drinking 
more after his father died of pancreatic cancer, but over time this coping strategy has 
transformed into chronic behavior. His maladaptive behavior has interfered with his ability 
to hold down a job and tend to his family, and therefore causes him significant distress. 
Recently, Mr. J’s wife decided that she can no longer cope. Frustrated by his continued use, 
inability to keep a job, and worried about the influence his drinking is having on their 
children, she has chosen to file for a divorce. 
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Using DSM-5 criteria, Mr. J would be diagnosed with alcohol use disorder. He has tried, but 
is unable, to curb his drinking. His behavior causes him significant distress, he has 
sustained this pattern for over a year, and it interferes with his ability to function in social 
contexts. Given his case, what do we believe about the sick role and Mr. J’s responsibility?  
 
Our instinctive interpretation of different aspects of Mr. J’s case will give us differential 
answers about how to respond and usually reflect our biases towards the moral or disease 
model of addiction. We can use some of Edward’s questions to help guide our thinking 
about Mr. J’s responsibility. For example, is Mr. J’s condition harmful to him? Given Mr. J’s 
distress and interpersonal tension his condition is causing, it seems clear that the condition 
is detrimental to his personal and social well-being. Is there any reason to legitimize Mr .J’s 
dependence as a character trait that he can choose to develop or maintain? Here we are 
asking whether when Mr. J began drinking after his father died, do we believe that he had a 
fair opportunity to try healthier coping mechanisms but instead resorted to drinking. Using 
the moral model of addiction, we would blame Mr. J for his addiction with the assumption 
that his drinking is something he can choose to do, and therefore, Mr. J continues to drink 
out of lack of self-control. However, if we believe that a combination of the moral and 
learning models of addiction is accurate, we would assume that Mr. J felt that he had no 
other options after his father died except to try and numb the pain with alcohol and 
unfortunately developed a dependence to it over time that now makes him incapable of 
voluntarily stopping.  
 
These two views imply different things about whether Mr. J’s drinking reflects faults in 
personhood (traits/behaviors that we can punish people for adopting) and his 
responsibility for developing and maintaining his addiction overtime. In both views, it does 
seem clear that we recognize that the man did make the initial decision to start drinking 
more when his father died. Therefore causal responsibility is not different between the two 
accounts. What varies is the ​blame ​placed on the man for starting to drink.  
 
However, learning new information about Mr. J’s history can change our assumptions about 
responsibility by influencing our answers to Edwardian criteria . Below, I spell out different 
backgrounds for Mr. J to demonstrate how different ethical, social, and environmental, 
factors can impact our analysis about responsibility even when the drinking behavior and 
consequences are the same.  
 
Biography A: Mr. J grew up in a middle class neighborhood with strong social networks 
within his household, school, and community. His parents made clear efforts to teach Mr. J 
important social values, and his father had a friend in college who died in a drunk driving 
accident making him particularly sensitive and explicit about the importance of responsible 
drinking behaviors. No one in Mr. J’s immediate family drank in excess and Mr. J has 
continued to have familial financial and emotional support throughout his lifetime. 
 
Biography B:​ ​Mr. J grew up in a poor neighborhood with high rates of crime, violence, and 
drug consumption. Due to work constraints, Mr. J’s parents weren’t around very much 
while he was growing up and he spent most of his time in the community. When Mr. J was 
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16, his father got laid off from his job. His dad was ashamed of his inability to provide for 
his family and began drinking in an attempt to dull his emotions. Mr. J’s father never 
developed alcohol dependence disorder, but he did regularly drink in excess during the 
seven months he was unemployed. As an adult, Mr. J has had little contact with his 
immediate family and doesn’t feel closely connected to anyone except his wife and children. 
 
From these backgrounds, we learn important information about Mr. J’s upbringing that 
likely influence his access to social resources and ability to choose appropriate coping 
mechanisms when faced with stress, or the fair opportunity component of responsibility. 
Youth and adolescence are critical periods during development that influence long term 
beliefs about social norms and appropriate behavior. In both biography A and B, Mr. J is 
exposed to actions and attitudes towards drinking that may either enhance or reduce his 
predisposition towards adopting unhealthy drinking behaviors. Given these two 
backgrounds, we can see that our answers to Edward’s questions b-e spelled out above, 
may be different depending on whether biography A or B is true (2009).  
 
In scenario A, Mr. J is given strong moral guidance during development with an acute focus 
on appropriate drinking and the dangers of overconsumption. He also receives social 
support at early and later time points during his life with  ties to his family. Mr. J is 
provided with the knowledge and resources to recognize and adopt healthier coping 
mechanisms when faced with stress and therefore he has a fair opportunity to choose 
appropriate actions. In Edwardian terms, Mr. J’s drinking is a result of him choosing to 
drink as he had proper exposure to moral values discouraging him to drink through 
childhood (Edwards, 2009). For these reasons, Mr. J has a high degree of responsibility in 
his initial decision to start increasing his drinking that leads to his chronic consumption.  
 
In scenario B, Mr. J has limited social support throughout his life and is exposed to several 
risk factors within his household and community that likely increase his odds of developing 
unhealthy coping behaviors. In particular, his father’s drinking in response to stress 
strengthen associations in Mr. J’s mind between alcohol and difficult scenarios. Using 
Edward’s terms, we may believe that although Mr. J’s drinking could have been discouraged 
during childhood with “the inoculation of appropriate moral values,” in order to reflect 
broader social values, it’s best not to hold him responsible since he didn’t have a chance to 
learn any other ways of coping during childhood and has never had social support 
(Edwards, 2009). For these reasons, Mr. J didn’t lacked a fair opportunity to not start 
drinking in response to stress. These points all demonstrate that if background B is true, 
we may have reasons to believe that Mr. J didn’t have the resources and information 
available to him to respond to his father’s death in a healthier way and thus has a 
diminished degree of responsibility for adopting detrimental drinking behaviors. 
 
When comparing Mr. J’s backgrounds and consequent responsibility for starting to drink as 
a response to stress, it’s clear that social resources and exposures influence his access and 
ability to choose healthier outlets and alternatives. This exercise emphasizes two things. 
One, that two individuals who receive the same diagnosis under DSM-5 criteria can have 
differential responsibility for their condition, and two, because at some point in time there 
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is an initial decision to engage in the behavior, it is possible to be responsible for 
developing a condition though at the time of diagnosis you may no longer be able to control 
your actions. 
 
Responsibility and Blame 
 
In the case study above, Mr. J is assigned different levels of responsibility for his alcohol 
dependence depending on certain social and environmental factors and influences. 
However, it is critical to note that he is deemed responsible at some level for his actions. In 
previous chapters I discussed how moralized attitudes like blame and gratitude are only 
appropriate emotions when an actor is a proper candidate to assume responsibility (Brink 
and Nelkin, 2011). Given this, the logic then follows that since Mr. J is responsible, he is also 
a justified target for blame. But, in the clinical context concerned with both appropriately 
diagnosing conditions as well as treating the patient, I want to argue for an alternative 
model; choice without blame. 
 
In this model crafted by Hannah Pickard, individuals can still be responsible for adopting 
certain behaviors and making decisions that ultimately can lead to different kinds of 
disorders. She believes that there are therapeutic reasons “for legitimizing the condition as 
a character trait that one can choose to develop or maintain” (Edwards, 2009). Namely that 
by applying responsibility, patients are given a sense of accountability and control over 
their actions that is not present when they are assumed to be passive victims to their 
condition (i.e. adopt the sick role) (Pickard, 2017). Even if the addict no longer has “insight 
into the condition’s effect upon” himself, cannot “take an active role in seeking treatment 
for himself,” and never had a fair opportunity to learn healthier ways of coping through 
“inoculation of appropriate moral values during childhood,” Pickard would argue that 
clinicians can and should still apply some level of responsibility for the initial decision to 
start drinking (Edwards, 2009). However, though the individuals are responsible, they are 
not blamed for their behavior (Pickard, 2017). Going back to ideas presented in chapter 
one, this means that an actor can be attributability responsible for an action without being 
morally responsible for an action. Given that moral responsibility is a subcategory of 
attributable responsibility, this is reality is achievable.  
 
This framework has clear pragmatic, forward-looking benefits. Allowing patients to feel 
empowered to change their condition without fear of being emotionally punished or 
stigmatized for their initial poor choices is the best pragmatic response. It marries the 
moral and disease model of condition by “acknowledging the role of choice in addiction” 
and “mobilizing a sense of agency and empowerment… through acknowledging and 
working with their agency without adopting moralising attitudes or stigmatised attitudes 
and practices” (Pickard, 2017). This model entails sustained work and collaboration 
between providers and patients in recognizing and treating addiction that is best fostered 
through comprehensive analysis, honest dialogue, and compassion. 
 
To demonstrate how this model would work in action, let’s apply it to the case of Mr. J. No 
matter if Mr. J had biography A or B, a clinician when discussing Mr. J’s condition with him 
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would acknowledge that Mr. J chose to start drinking more in response to his father’s death 
and is responsible for this initial action. When doing this, the physician would make clear 
that Mr. J’s behavior didn’t reveal deeper insight into his moral character. The doctor would 
assure Mr. J that he is not a bad person and explicitly indicate to Mr. J and his loved ones 
that Mr. J shouldn’t be blamed or stigmatized for his past actions. However, the physician 
would emphasize that Mr. J has the underlying capacity to control his condition. Though in 
the immediate situation Mr. J may need more outside assistance or medical intervention to 
help put him back into a position where he can exert full psychological and physical 
control, his ability to do so remains constant throughout his treatment. Ultimately, the 
physician would tell Mr. J that he can change his condition and that the success of his 
recovery is predicated on his desire and will to do so. By holding Mr. J accountable without 
blaming or shaming him, the clinician empowers Mr. J to overcome his addiction through 
compassion and without guilt or fear that he is morally inadequate. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Psychiatric dysfunctions are conditions that have been historically identified in 
relationship to social norms for appropriate thoughts and behaviors, making mental illness 
categories both temporally and geographically relative. Different frameworks for 
consistently recognizing and defining what conditions constitute mental illness have been 
often ignored in the subjective component of psychiatric disorders in an attempt to 
minimize biases when defining mental illness. However, as discussed above, purely 
objective criteria are insufficient in capturing psychological dysfunction because normative 
considerations are embedded within the mental illness label. Because of these ethical 
implications, I argue that we should embrace and explore a more normative conception of 
psychiatric dysfunction and create a model of responsibility to help clarify when a 
condition should be labeled as mental illness. Ultimately, responsibility lies on a spectrum 
and thus the appropriateness of the sick role also comes in different degrees. 
 
In clinical contexts, detailed and comprehensive case-by-case analysis is necessary to come 
to proper conclusions about responsibility and consequently of the appropriateness of the 
mental illness label as specifics are critical to this decision. Though not appropriate for all 
kinds of mental illness, in cases of dysfunction where there is potential for agency and 
responsibility, these two qualities should be recognized without blame. By acknowledging 
the capacity of patients to act on their own volition to change their condition and 
behaviors, clinicians better empower them to participate in their treatment and reintegrate 
with society. This approach and framework of choice without blame is a forward-looking 
model that offers the best pragmatic response for allowing patients to feel capable of fully 
recovering and changing their behaviors. Providers who treat and diagnose mental illness 
should be trained to approach patients with compassion and discuss conditions and 
treatment without stigmatization or implying that the patient has faults in personhood. 
 
Although compassionate care may be the current standard in clinical practice, I suggest 
several radical changes to the way clinicians understand mental illness. I argue that 
physicians should abandon the traditional framework for understanding psychiatric 
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disease (i.e. the BPS model) as it is imprecise and fails to acknowledge the ethical 
implications of the mental illness label. When physicians fail to recognize that psychiatric 
disease is value-laden, they may inappropriately encourage patients to adopt the sick-role, 
which can be detrimental to their patients’ perceived sense of self-efficacy and may weaken 
forward-looking goals therapy that includes patient empowerment and independence from 
the condition. It should be noted that in applications of the sick role, ​the ethical 
considerations used are informed by my account of responsibility but not decided by it. 
Though patients might not be entirely responsible for developing their condition, in some 
cases there may be pragmatic benefits to treating them this way so that they can become 
responsible. This approach is forward-looking and focused on long term recovery. 
 
Try as we might, we cannot yet fully reduce therapeutic intervention to a purely scientific 
or technical process. The ambiguity and irreducibility of human emotional and 
psychological issues mandate an experiential and empathetic element in treatment. This 
necessity does not deny that there are biological causes for mental or emotional illness. 
Instead, it asserts that the manifestation of the problem may require both medical and 
social, interpersonal interventions. Neither approach is always sufficient by itself to obtain 
full wellness. In advocating for a more normative framework of mental illness, I am not 
suggesting that interpersonal approaches are more effective than more technical, 
drug-based treatments. However, what I am claiming is that case-by-case analysis is critical 
and that the consideration of individual factors captured through a more social, interactive 
approach is critical to the current diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.  
 
Physicians should be mindful of the normative implications of the mental illness label and 
then decide on an individual basis whether the sick role is appropriate based on the 
patient’s history, the type of pyschiatric disease, and the patient’s potential for recovery. 
Therapy must be specific to the patient as identical mental illness categories can be caused 
by a variety of factors and thus are best treated using different approaches and 
mixed-methodologies. 
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